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EVOLUTION OF THE DUTY OF CARE:
SOME THOUGHTSt
James P. Murphy*
Professor Murphy offers his views on the emerging and yet un-
certain area of duty of care in tort law. He sees an evolution
occurring in the courts' approach toward a generalized rule of
duty defined by foreseeability. He does not purport to examine
each and every thread in this complex evolutionary fabric, but
rather attempts to lay the groundwork by examining the path fol-
lowed in England and contrasting it to the dual American develop-
ment of duty defined by particularized relationships (privity of
contract or special relationship under Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 315) and of duty defined by foreseeability despite the ab-
sence of such relationships. Professor Murphy sees this bifurcated
history intersect and commingle in the Tarasoff cases, with the
generalized duty emerging as the true victor.
INTRODUCTION
Nearly a hundred years have passed since Heaven v. Pender' proposed a
rationale of duty of care separate from that which rested on trespass and
contract. The rationale proposed would operate without the help of these
two primal sources from which, in a remarkable pattern of cross-
germination, the operating rules dealing with human conduct in relation to
the negligence concept had taken their origin. The rationale proposed was
novel, different; but it was more than that. It was revolutionary. This
rationale was that duty hinges on foreseeability, nothing more and nothing
less.
This capacity for the revolutionization of tort law was recognized im-
mediately by some who were unfriendly to the implications of Heaven v.
Pender; they berated it handily. But the law is an accommodating, moderat-
ing body. Limited and qualified, the case took its place on that shelf of old
bottles we call precedent. Life went on. Acts of momentary neglect took
lives and limbs, as they do still on a grander scale. It may be time to
attempt to fit Heaven v. Pender and its offspring and kin into an evolution-
ary scheme; this Article is an attempt. Beginning with a survey of the histor-
ical roots of duty here and in England, and then considering the Re-
statement of Torts special relationship proviso, the Article concludes with an
examination of cases on the cutting edge of duty of care evolution, offering a
few thoughts on a likely sequel.
t Copyright 1981, James P. Murphy.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Bridgeport; LL.B., University of Maine.
1. [18831 11 Q.B.D. 503.
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THE ORIGIN OF THE DuTY OF CARE:
RELATION AND FORESEEABILITY
Lord Esher's famous words in Heaven v. Pender2 constituted the first
statement of the modern concept of duty in tort law.
[W]henever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position
with regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who did think
would At once recognise that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in
his own conduct with regard to those circumstances he would cause dan-
ger of injury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use
ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger.3
His analysis relied almost wholly upon the idea of relationship. He won-
dered if there was not some fundamental source of duty of care, a source
that subsumed the duty arising out of contract and also out of active trespas-
sory negligence.' What was the relation, he asked, between the pilots of
two ships approaching each other on a collision course, when one or both of
the pilots realized the peril of the situation.5 His answer was that a relation
arose at that very instant when the danger was or ought to have been per-
ceived, and the relation defined the duty. In this way, Lord Esher formu-
lated his "larger proposition," 6 governing liability irrespective of contract.
Applied to the hypothetical of the pilots and the ships, the larger proposi-
tion treated the lives of the two pilots as if they intersected briefly in time
and space, and this relation and the concomitant duty continued until the
intersection terminated, the ships slid by each other unharmed, and the
danger was past.7 The source of this new relation did not derive from con-
tract law. Lord Esher himself suggested that it was founded in humanism
and perhaps in natural law when he stated that "every one ought by the
universally recognized rules of right and wrong, to think so much with re-
gard to the safety of others who may be jeoparidized by his conduct." 8
An earlier American case, Thomas v. Winchester,9 played at least some
part in the formulation of Lord Esher's opinion." In this case, a manufac-
turer of drugs negligently labelled as dandelion extract a jar of belladonna, a
poisonous substance. By normal chain of sale the jar of belladonna came into
2. Id. (Lord Esher was previously known as Brett, M.R.). In Heaven v. Pender, the
defendant, a dock owner, contracted with a shipowner to provide a stage so that the ship's sides
might be painted. Plaintiff, the painter, was injured when a rope broke and the stage fell.
Although the plaintiff was not in privity of contract with the defendant, he brought a cause of
action for his injuries. The lower court denied relief Id. at 504.
3. Id. at 509
4. id.
5. Id. at 508-09.
6. id. at 509.
7. Id. at 508.
8. id.
9. 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
10. See Heaven v. Pender, [1883] 11 Q.B.D. 503, 514 (citing Thomas v. Winchester).
[Vol. 30:147
DUTY OF CARE
the hands of a physician who prescribed it to his patient. The manufacturer's
defense to the patient's suit was that he was a remote vendor of the medi-
cine and that he had no "privity or connection"" with the physician's pa-
tient. Because there was no relation, there was likewise no duty. This was
the orthodox position. The defendant at most would admit a duty to its
immediate buyer; however, the court ignored the contract of sale. The duty
of care, said the court, arose not from the original sale of the article, but
rather from the nature of the business and the defendant's knowledge that
death or great bodily harm would be the natural and inevitable consequence
of placing a falsely labelled poison on the market. 2 There was, moreover, a
direct relationship between the manufacturer and the patient; it was not
necessary to trace the defendant's obligations into a series of transactions
leading from the manufacturer finally to the injured plaintiff, or to decide
whether the original duty may have been attenuated at successive points in
the chain. The duty was to the whole world, not in the literal sense, as no
more than a few persons could possibly partake of the contents of the mis-
labelled jar, but in the more important sense that by manufacturing drugs
for human consumption the defendant had voluntarily entered into an incho-
ate or potential relationship which might be activated at any time.
Like Lord Esher's opinion in Heaven v. Pender, the court in Thomas v.
Winchester was primarily concerned with human safety: "So highly does the
law value human life, that it admits of no justification wherever life has been
lost and the carelessness or negligence of one person has contributed to the
death of another." '1 Thus, without pronouncing or articulating Lord Esher's
"larger proposition," the New York court had applied its principle in a
pragmatic American way thirty years before Heaven v. Pender."
When, in 1916, Justice Cardozo wrote his opinion in MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., besides relying upon Heaven v. Pender,'6 he referred to
11. 6 N.Y. at 407.
12. Id. at 408-10.
13. Id. at 409. This phrase originated from an older criminal case, Regina v. Swindall, 175
Eng. Rep. 95, 97 (N.P. 1846). In Swindall, the court relied upon principles of criminal law
when it reasoned that a chemist who negligently mislabels and sells a poison thereby causing a
death not only is guilty of manslaughter, but also breaches a tort duty. It was the spirit of the
analogy to criminal law, rather than its logic, that struck the Swindall court. Id.
14. Curiously, a case factually similar to Heaven v. Pender was decided in New York one
year before that decision: Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470 (1882). A third party had negligently
constructed scaffolding for the use of plaintiff's employer, and the plaintiff-employee fell to his
death. In both Heaven v. Pender and Devlin the defense asserted was that there was no privity
of contract between the decedent and the scaffold builder. The Devlin court, in holding that the
case fell within the principle of Thomas v. Winchester, stated that liability rested "not upon any
contract or direct privity . . . but upon the duty which the law imposes on every one to avoid
acts in their nature dangerous to the lives of others." Id. at 477. Although the Devlin court thus
recognized that liability hinged on duty, the Heaven v. Pender court was the first to articulate
that the source of the duty was foreseeability.
15. 2,17 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). See notes 16-19 & 36-53 and accompanying text
infra.
16. 217 N.Y. at 388, 111 N.E. at 1052.
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Thomas v. Winchester as a landmark and as having laid the foundations in
this branch of the law. 7 The precise holding of MacPherson, in fact, was to
ease the restrictive view that the principle of Thomas v. Winchester was
limited to poisons, explosives, and things of a convulsive or violent nature.
The wheel of an automobile, if negligently made, could have as much capac-
ity for danger as a deadly poison or dynamite."8
Lord Esher's larger proposition applies with an equal amount of logical
force to both acts and omissions. Grounded in ethics and a concern for hu-
man safety, instead of in positive undertakings, assumptions of duty, or con-
tractual obligations, the larger proposition is blind to the distinction between
action and non-action. It requires every person to take affirmative precau-
tions for the safety of others. A similar regard is noticeable in MacPherson,
where the court, in effect, told the defendant, "You must take specific ac-
tions: you must inspect and test the wheels if you plan to put them on
automobiles that you intend to sell to the public.""' The judicial process
had become a mechanism to teach the members of the body politic how they
could live safer and therefore better lives.2" Nevertheless, the doctrine of
17. Id. at 387, 111 N.E. at 1052.
18. Id. Accord, Hodge & Sons v. Anglo-American Oil Co., 12 Lloyd's List L.R. 183 (Ct. of
Appeals 1922). The court observed:
Personally, I do not understand the difference between a thing dangerous in itself,
as poison, and a thing not dangerous as a class, but by negligent construction
dangerous as a particular thing. The latter, if anything, seems the more dangerous
of the two; it is a wolf in sheep's clothing instead of an obvious wolf.
Id. at 187.
19. This was implicit in the MacPherson holding that negligence would lie when there was
either a commission of a negligent act or omission of a duty. The facts in MacPherson indicated
an omission, and the contest centered on the question of whether or not there was a duty to
inspect. Thus, because an automobile is manufactured with component parts that are often
produced by outside sources, and because the automobile manufacturer is responsible for the
finished product, it has an affirmative duty to determine whether, as a whole, the car is in safe
operating condition. 217 N.Y. at 390, 111 N.E. at 1054. Similarly, in Thomas v. Winchester, it
is probable that had the defendant demonstrated that he had maintained control over his opera-
tion and taken reasonable steps to minimize the risk of mislabelling, he might have refuted the
allegations of negligence.
20. Cardozo's "duty of vigilance" offers a mechanism by which the obligation to take af-
firmative measures for the safety of others might be translated into specific actions. The duty
of vigilance arguably raises the general, or reasonable person, standard of care. As such it is the
natural corollary of the duty to take affirmative action. It does not simply describe, it pre-
scribes. The vigilance standard is akin to the trustee's standard of care: to use the same care and
prudence that one would use when dealing with his or her own affairs. See G. BOGERT, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 541 (2d rev. ed. 1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §
174 (1959). Trust cases often employ the words duty to exercise vigilance when describing the
trustee's standard of care. See, e.g., Grace v. Corn Exch. Bank & Trust Co., 287 N.Y. 94, 102,
38 N.E. 449, 452 (1941) (bank under no duty to exercise vigilance to protect estate from possi-
ble embezzlement by trustees); Anderson v. Blood, 152 N.Y. 285 (1897) (beneficiaries of estate
have strict duty of vigilance in case of intending purchaser).
The addition to the reasonable person standard of an element that requires the actor to
reflects on how he or she would wish to be treated thus revolutionizes the concept of duty.
It firmly implants on the duty concept the lesson of the Golden Rule, or as Confucianism calls
[Vol. 30:147
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Heaven v. Pender did not receive acceptance overnight, even in England,"
and American courts have not yet realized the ultimate implications of Mac-
Pherson or Thomas v. Winchester."
In England, Lord Buckmaster, dissenting in Donoghue v. Stevenson' in
1932, fairly represented the feeling of many when he said that Heaven v.
Pender "should be buried so securely that [its] perturbed spirits shall no
longer vex the law."'4 But the majority opinion was seminal. The plaintiff
had suffered from shock and gastroenteritis when a snail emerged from a
bottle of gingerbeer that she had already half drunk. Before coming into the
plaintiff's hands, the sealed bottle had passed from the manufacturer to a
distributor, to a storekeeper, who finally sold it to her. The chain of posses-
sion was much the same as in Thomas v. Winchester." In Donoghue v.
Stevenson, Lord Atkin enunciated the so-called "neighbor principle." '
Like Lord Esher before him, he wanted to fashion a succinct yet workable
concept of relationship giving rise to duty of care. The neighbor relationship,
simple, straightforward, yet containing moral and humanitarian overtones,
was Atkin's prototype. In ordinary, everyday life the relationship that exists
among neighbors is not an established, definite human relationship, such as
those existing between husband and wife, child and parent, creditor and
debtor, or employer and employee." It lacks explicit and objective qual-
ities. Still, it is more than a relationship of one man to the world at large, or
of one man to a corporate humanity.
Lord Atkin's proposition was that one must take reasonable precautions to
avoid acts and omissions that can be reasonably foreseen as likely to injure a
it, the Silver Rule: what one does not want done to himself or herself, do not do to others. See H.
SMITH, THE RELIGIONS OF MAN 168 (1958).
21. Lord Esher himself supposedly qualified the "larger proposition" of Heaven v. Pender in
Le Lievre v. Gould, [1893] 1 Q.B.D. 491, where he stated that "[a] man is entitled to be as
negligent as he pleases towards the whole world if he owes no duty to them." Id. at 497. See
also Earl v. Lubbock, [1905] 1 K.B.D. 253 (driver injured by a wheel disengaging from a van
which the driver's employer was hound by contract with the driver to keep in repair; held that
no duty existed). Such minor limitations and qualifications, not unusual after a bold principle
has been pronounced, typify the two steps forward-one step backward syndrome characteristic
of the judiciary's handling of the duty issue. Justice Cardozo followed just such a pattern after
MacPherson in Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928). See
notes 41-57 and accompanying text infra.
22. See notes 43-59 and accompanying text infra.
23. [1932] A.C. 562.
24. Id. at 576 (Buckmaster, L.J., dissenting). Lord Tomlin, his co-dissenter, wanted to know
where it would all end. He envisioned and shrank back from the prospect where every person
injured in a railway accident caused by a defective axle might have a cause of action against the
manufacturer of the axle. To him the prospect was appalling. Id. at 600. This was an example of
"the most absurd and outrageous consequences" and "the infinity of actions" that Lord Abinger
had warned against nearly a century before in Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402,
404-05 (Ex. 1842), when it was held that an injured coachman, not in privity with the negligent
repairer of the coach, could not recover.
25. See notes 9-11 and accompanying text supra.
26. [1932] A.C. 562.
27. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TOrTS §§ 314, 314A, 315 (1965) (discussed in notes 61-63
and accompanying text infra).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
neighbor.' A neighbor, according to Atkin, was any person "so closely and
directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have [him] in contem-
plation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or
omissions which are called in question." ' He understood this proposition
to be the same doctrine that Lord Esher laid down in Heaven v. Pender.°
Because the manufacturer intended his commodity to be consumed, he had
placed himself in a relationship with all potential customers. From that rela-
tionship arose the duty of care.
The effect of Donoghue v. Stevenson was to melt slowly away any further
opposition to Heaven v. Pender. By 1978, it could finally be said with no
small degree of certainty that in England a duty of care did not depend
upon fitting a set of facts into the confines of a previously established rule or
a particular situation; 3 there was no general "no duty" rule. Duty depended
upon whether there was "a sufficient relationship of proximity or
neighbourhood" such that negligence on the part of one person would likely
cause harm to another. If there was such a relationship, then the only mat-
ter left for consideration was whether policy considerations should reduce or
limit the scope of duty.' The gist of Heaven v. Pender was that relationship
meant foreseeability of harm resulting from one's acts or omissions, and it
presumed an interest in human welfare.
THE AMERICAN VENTURE: ASCENT AND RETREAT
In the United States, the path of development from a "no duty" rule to a
presumption of duty has been less clearly defined than in England. In
Thomas v. Winchester," there was no articulation of the foundation of duty
beyond the court's observation that Winterbottom v. Wright' was inappli-
28. [19321 A.C. at 599.
29. Id. at 580.
30. Id. at 599.
31. See Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [19781 A.C. 728, 755-59, aff'g, [1977] 2
W.L.R. 1024 (noted in 93 L.Q. REV. 488 (1977) and 36 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 245 (1977)).
32. Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [1978 A.C. 728, 751-52.
33. Id. the Anns court set forth the bifurcated analysis to be undertaken in evaluating the
duty issue.
First one has to ask whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and the person
who has suffered damage there is a sufficient relationship of proximity or neighbour-
hood such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness on his
part may be likely to cause damage to the latter-in which case a prima facie duty
of care arises. Secondly, if the first question is answered affirmatively, it is neces-
sary to consider whether there are any considerations which ought to negative, or
to reduce or limit one scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is
owed....
Id.
34. 6 N.Y. 397 (1852). See notes 9-14 and accompanying text supra.
35. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). The court held that when there is no relation, there is no
duty. Id. at 403.
[Vol. 30:147
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cable because a poison, unlike a stagecoach, is inherently dangerous.*' The
court made no attempt to invoke a positive basis for a relationship between
the injured patient and the manufacturer. Even Justice Cardozo in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.17 preferred to broaden the rule in Thomas
v. Winchester to include, besides explosives and poisons, things whose na-
ture is such as to reasonably place life and limb in peril when negligently
made." A wheel with a weak spoke was one such thing of danger." Yet, it
is a truism that anything can be dangerous to human life." Although Car-
dozo enlarged the rule in Thomas v. Winchester by expanding the field of
things likely to result in injury, he failed to deal in terms with the rela-
tionship between the parties.
Twelve years after the MacPherson decision, in 1928, Cardozo again had
an opportunity to theorize about the foundations of duty in H. R. Moch Co.
v. Rensselaer Water Co.4 The defendant contracted with the city to pro-
vide water for its inhabitants. A fire occurred, and because of the water
company's negligent failure to furnish an adequate supply of water under the
proper pressure, the firemen were unable to prevent it from spreading to
plaintiff's building.12
The company was in the business of supplying water to meet the needs of
the city, and knew that one use of the water of critical importance to the
city and its inhabitants was in putting out fires. To establish a Heaven v.
Pender relation between the water company and the injured plaintiff, it
would have been unnecessary to go beyond the definition of a fire hydrant.
Likewise, under Donoghue v. Stevenson, the plaintiff was clearly a "neigh-
bor" of the water company; the latter ought reasonably to have considered
the owners of buildings with regard to its negligent omission to provide
water to extinguish fires. It was reasonably foreseeable to the waterworks
that a failure to provide water could very likely lead to the loss of life and
property. These circumstances created a direct relationship, which was acti-
vated when defendant's negligence exposed plaintiff to risk.13
Cardozo, however, denied the existence of the relationship." Without
saying so, he reverted to Winterbottom v. Wright. The water supply con-
tract was with the city, not with the plaintiff, who was thus not in privity
36. 6 N.Y. at 408-10.
37. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
38. Id. at 387, 111 N.E. at 1052.
39. The exception created in MacPherson has today swallowed the rule. A long series of
decisions following MacPherson held that a seller is liable in negligence for any product that
may reasonably be expected to be capable of inflicting substantial harm if defective. The courts
have found that many products satisfy this standard. See, e.g., Smith v. S.S. Kresge Co., 79
F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1935) (hair combs); Sheward v. Virtue, 20 Cal. 2d 410, 126 P.2d 345 (1942)
(chair); Simmons Co. v. Hardin, 75 Ga. App. 420, 43 S.E.2d 553 (1947) (sofa bed); Carter v.
Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946) (perfume).
40. See, e.g., cases cited in note 39 supra.
41. 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
42. Id. at 163, 159 N.E. at 896-97.
43. See notes 25-29 and accompanying text supra.
44. 247 N.Y. at 168-69, 159 N.E. at 898-99.
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with the water company. The Moch plaintiff was in no better position than
the injured coachman in Winterbottom v. Wright.
Cardozo voiced the fear that the assumption of one relation would lead to
the involuntary assumption of a series of new relations "inescapably hooked
together,""5 a kind of lineal privity bursting forth into an array of entirely
new obligations at each link in the chain.46 His rationalization of the case on
tort principles depended largely upon characterizing the alleged negligence
of the defendant as nonfeasance.47
45. 247 N.Y. at 168, 159 N.E. at 899. The decision was plainly based upon a concern for
the "crushing burden," id. at 165, 159 N.E. at 897-98, that would fall on the water companies if
liability were imposed, a position that finds adherents exactly a half-century after Moch. See,
e.g., Libbey v. Hampton Water Works Co., 118 N.H. 500, 389 A.2d 434 (1978). The fear that
liability will be "unduly and indefinitely extended" and the consequent judicial dread of the
"crushing burden" is a monotonously repeated theme which is played, with little variation, in
case after case where unwilling courts are faced with the challenges of new situations. See, e.g.,
Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1979) (city not liable to injured
student for negligently failing to discover a fire code violation); Donohue v. Copiague U. Free
School Dist., 64 A.D.2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978) (school system not liable for negligent
failure to teach former student to read), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 440, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979); Korn-
blut v. Chevron Oil Co., 62 A.D.2d 831, 407 N.Y.S.2d 498 (1978) (decedent had flat tire on a
state thruway in 92' heat; within hour state trooper stopped and reported disabled vehicle to
defendant and informed decedent assistance would arrive in 20 minutes; defendant had contract
with state to provide assistance to disabled vehicles within 30 minutes of notification; defendant
failed to appear and after waiting two more hours decedent, with help of wife and son, changed
tire but suffered heart attack in so doing) (Cardozo's "crushing burden" argument in Moch cited
with approval in denial of liability), aff'd, 48 N.Y. 853, 424 N.Y.S.2d 429, 400 N.E.2d 368
(1979); Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968) (city
not liable when young woman who had repeatedly sought and been refused police protection
was murdered by ex-suitor who had repeatedly threatened her life) (in dissent by Justice Keat-
ing, "crushing burden" argument castigated and called a myth). But see Schuster v. City of New
York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958) (city liable for negligent failure to
provide police protection to informant) ("crushing burden" argument and predictions of dire
financial consequences rejected by majority).
To the "crushing burden" argument, and to the "outrageous consequences" and "infinity of
actions" that terrified Lord Abinger in Winterbottom v. Wright, the best reply comes in the
words of Justice Musmanno in Doyle v. South Pittsburgh Water Co., 414 Pa. 199, 218-19, 199
A.2d 875, 884 (1964), where the court, declining to follow Cardozo's lead in Moch, stated:
Throughout the entire history of the law, legal Jeremiahs have moaned that if
financial responsibility were imposed in the accomplishment of certain enterprises,
the ensuing litigation would be great, chaos would reign and civilization would
stand still. It was argued that if railroads had to be responsible for their acts of
negligence, no company could possibly run trains; if turnpike companies had to pay
for harm done through negligence, no roads would be built; if municipalities were
to be financially liable for damage done by their motor vehicles, their treasuries
would be depleted. Nevertheless liability has been imposed in accordance with
elementary rules of justice and the moral code, and civilization in consequence, has
not been bankrupted, nor have the courts been inundated with confusion.
46. 247 N.Y. at 168, 159 N.E. at 899.
47. Id. at 167-69, 159 N.E. at 898-99. Cardozo stated that a previously existing relationship
was necessary before there could be recovery for nonfeasances or omissions, with the one ex-
ception of "instruments of harm," such as the automobile with rotten spokes in MacPherson. Id.
at 168, 159 N.E. at 898. Thus, he defined the concept of relationship to exclude from its
operation relations not containing privity. The result was effectively to immunize the water
company from liability.
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Superficially, this characterization seems reasonable because the plaintiff
had alleged that his loss resulted from a failure to supply enough water. Yet,
whether the failure to provide water enough to put out the fire is character-
ized as an act of commission or omission, or as a misfeasance or a nonfea-
sance, is irrelevant. 8 The question can only be of semantic interest because
it is unanswerable. 4" Moch and MacPherson are similar in that the final end
of both defendants' alleged negligence was a condition fraught with foresee-
able potential for harm, in one case an insufficient supply of water, in the
other a wheel with weak spokes. In MacPherson, the plaintiff isolated a spe-
cific act, inspection, which could have minimized the possibility of wheels
with weak spokes. In Moch, the plaintiff, having no knowledge at all of the
intricacies of operation of a water company, alleged simply the condition
which had so obviously caused his loss. The factual genesis of this condition
may have originated in specific, directed, physical acts that were so positive
and affirmative as to approach recklessness. Without technical knowledge of
the operation of a waterworks, it was impossible for the plaintiff or anyone
else to say what negligent acts or omissions may have caused insufficient
pressure and supply at hydrants.50
If, in its legal effect, characterizing the failure to provide sufficient water
at the hydrant as an omission is correct,5 then the whole law of negligence
may be accurately described as dealing solely with omission and nonfea-
sance: the failure to exercise reasonable care. In reducing the problem to an
analysis of misfeasance and nonfeasance, Cardozo's decision merely returns
circuitously to the old "no duty" rule when the relationship between the
wrongdoer and the injured is not forged by contractual privity.5"
The opinions of Cardozo in MacPherson and Moch typify the discontinuity
characteristic of the treatment and evolution of the duty concept in the
48, See notes 49 & 50 infra.
49. If we turn to physics for an answer, and take the example of a train crashing into a
station because of the inattentiveness of the engineer, it is possible to characterize his negligent
conduct both as a misfeasance and a nonfeasance. He negligently failed to turn off the steam
valve at the proper time in order to bring the train to stop. He has therefore omitted to do
something which he ought to have done: a nonfeasance. The result is that steam continues to
flow from the boiler, the engine continues to turn the wheels, and the train smashes into the
station, an occurrence which though originating physically in a non-act or non-deed, has all the
positive qualities of a misfeasance. To treat this accident as a nonfeasance would be absurd, and
Cardozo approvingly cited Kelly v. Metropolitan Ry. Co., [18951 1 Q.B. 944, which made the
same point. He was willing to grant that a passenger could recover from the railway in that
example. But to an injured party there is no difference between the engineer who negligently
fails to turn off the steam and the waterworks employee who negligently fails to turn on the
water. In Moch, liability depends curiously not so much on affective human agency as it does
upon the medium through which it operates.
50. Cf. Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, 1 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1951); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 39, at 226 (4th ed. 1971) (both employing like rationale to
justify existence of res ipsa loquitur doctrine).
51. See cases cited in note 53 infra.
52. See generally Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. R 1v. 791 (1966).
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United States. 3 Although Cardozo purported to limit MacPherson
narrowly, 51 the principle on which it was based, being identical to Lord
Esher's "larger proposition" and Lord Atkin's "neighbor principle," quickly
emerged as a potent force in American law. In Moch, on the other hand,
there seemed a disappointing affirmation of the privity of Winterbottom v.
Wright.m The attachment to Winterbottom and Moch continues to co-exist
with the progeny of MacPherson in American tort law.5"
FORMALIZING THE AMERICAN INTERDICTION: SECTION 315
If there was any doubt about the position American courts would take on
the basic question posed by the two cases, it was largely settled in 1934 by
53. For cases following MacPherson, see note 40 supra. An equally long line of decisions
follow Mach's requirement that privity of contract is needed before liability will be found. See,
e.g., City of Jamestown v. Pennsylvania Gas Co., 1 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1924) (gas company not
liable when it failed to provide gas and injuries resulted); McClendon v. T.L. James & Co., 231
F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1956) (highway contractor who began work not liable for failure to post
warnings about bad conditions on the road); Earl E. Roher Transfer & Storage Co. v, Hutch-
inson Water Co., 182 Kan. 546, 322 P.2d 810 (1958) (water company not liable for injuries
when it failed to provide water); East Coast Freight Lines v. Consolidated Gas, Electric, Light
& Power Co., 187 Md. 385, 50 A.2d 246 (1946) (company not found liable for injuries which
resulted when company failed to light the streets); Reimann v. Monmouth Consol. Water Co., 9
N.J. 134, 87 A.2d 325 (1952) (water company not liable for injuries when it failed to provide
water).
54. 217 N.Y. 382, 385, 111 N.E. 1050, 1051 (1916).
55. Products liability was "born" in 1916 with MacPherson. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (strict liability is the
standard of care in products liability cases); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (car dealer and manufacturer both held to an implied warranty of
safety). See generally P. KEETON, D. OWEN & J. MONTGOMEBY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND
SAFETY: CASES AND MATERIALS 20 (1980); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§
96-104 (4th ed. 1971).
56. 247 N.Y. at 164-66, 159 at 896, 897-98. Justice Cardozo also stated that the person
seeking reparation must show that the benefit of the contract to him or her is primary and
immediate. Id. at 164, 159 N.E. at 899. In other words, because the plaintiff was not in privity
with the water company, the plaintiff had to show that the company intended to be answerable
to individual members of the city. Under the Moch analysis, the injured coachman in Winter-
bottom and the plaintiff in Moch shared equal status: no privity of contract. In other words, if
the purchaser of the coach had been injured rather than the third-party coachman, there would
have been grounds for an action in tort against the manufacturer. Similarly, if the city had
suffered damage to a public building as the result of the water company's alleged negligence, it
is clear that the city could have recovered. In reality, however, neither plaintiff was in privity
with the supplier. Thus, both were denied recovery.
A few years later, in a seminal and influential article, Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control
the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886 (1934), the authors, in approving of Cardozo's treat-
ment of the concept of relationship in Moch, stated that there was no duty to exercise reason-
able care with regard to omissions and nonfeasances except where "certain socially recognized
relations" existed. Id. at 887. They were not thinking of Lord Esher's larger proposition or Lord
Atkin's neighbor principle, which were also framed in terms of relationship; they had in mind
situations involving what amounted to legal privity, as for example the relation of parent to
child, carrier to passenger, and owner to invitee.
57. See notes 40 & 53 supra.
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the Restatement of Torts.5" Section 314 of Topic 7 entitled "Duties of
Affirmative Action," recognized that there was no general duty to exercise
reasonable care with regard to another if that exercise involved the necessity
of taking positive action.59  There were exceptions dealt with in Topic 7,°
and by 1965, when the Second Restatement appeared, a section was added
enumerating them,6 such as the relationship of a carrier to its passengers,'6
58. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1934).
59. Id. § 314. The section states in pertinent part: "The actor's realization that action on his
part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to
take such action."
60. Id. § 315. The "Special Relationship" section provides:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him
from causing bodily harm to another unless,
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a
duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the
other a right of protection.
Id. Thus was created an attractive symmetry: on the one hand a duty to control and on the
other a duty to protect, with the special relation acting as the generative touchstone. Despite its
nice appearance, when read in conjunction with §§ 316-320, it becomes questionable whether §
315 was or indeed was even meant to be anything more than a superficial abridgment of the
latter sections, and itself devoid of intrinsic content. As far as the duty to control (§ 315(a)) is
concerned, Comment c explicitly observes that "the relations between the actor and a third
person which require the actor to control the third person's conduct are stated in §§ 316-319."
Those sections dealt with the duty of a parent to control a child (§ 316), of a master to control a
servant (§ 317), of the owner of land to control a licensee (§ 318), and of one in charge of a
dangerous person (§ 319). As far as § 315(b) (the duty to protect) is concerned, that section
seems to be no more than a concise nutshell of § 320 (duty of person having custody of another
to control conduct of third persons) (i.e., to protect the person in custody), and Comment a of §
320 describes it as applicable to sheriffs, jailers, wardens, officials, and teachers. In fact, Com-
ment c to § 315 tells us that "another relationship which creates the same duty is stated in §
320." One is led to wonder whether § 315 served any' singular function at all.
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 314A (1965). Tile section reads as follows:
§ 314 A. Special Relations Giving Rise to Duty to Aid or Protect
(1) A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take reasonable action
(a) to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm, and
(b) to give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know that they are ill or
injured, and to care for them until they can be cared for by others.
(2) An innkeeper is tinder a similar duty to his guests.
(3) A possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a similar duty to
members of the public who enter in response to his invitation.
(4) One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of
another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal opportu-
nities for protection is under a similar duty to the other.
Even though § 314A by the terms of its caveat left room for the addition of duties, it was
apparent that any "new" duties could not come from beyond the ambit defined by the protec-
tion-control "special relationship," a rather limited field for expansion. Moreover, according to
the Restatement, the only case found from 1934 to 1965 which recognized a tort duty arising
from a relation not specificaly stated in § 314A (or, by implication, in §§ 316-320), was Hutch-
inson v. Dickie, 162 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1947), where a guest on a private yacht fell overboard.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (APPENDIX) § 314A, Caveat, at 17 (1965). This use of the term
"special relationship" in § 315 is miles apart from Lord Thankertol's use of the same term in
Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562, 603.
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 314A (1965).
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an innkeeper to his guests, ' a possessor of land to members of the public
coming in response to an invitation,M and one having custody of another who
is unable to care for himself or herself.M While section 315 spoke of a "spe-
cial relationship"' ' as the requirement necessary for the imposition of a duty
of care, it was clear that the section contemplated "socially recognized
relationships."'67 The introduction of new specific duties or a general evolu-
tion into the duty of care found in Heaven v. Pender would have to employ
the Restatement somehow and fit into the protection-control reasoning of
section 315.'
Courts typically used section 315, the "special relationship" section, as a
tool to deny liability in those novel situations that constitute the stuff from
which tort law is continually developing. Thus, in Richards v. Stanley,7 °
where the defendant parked his automobile on a busy street and left it un-
locked with the keys in the ignition, a thief stole the automobile, and in-
jured the plaintiff, the California court held that "in the absence of a special
relationship between the parties, there is no duty to control the conduct of a
third person so as to prevent him from causing harm to another.""1
If the duty question in Richards v. Stanley had been analyzed in terms of
Heaven v. Pender, the question would have been whether the owner of the




66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965). This section states the general principle
of the Duty to Control Conduct of Third Persons:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from
causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a
duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the
other a right to protection.
The Restatement clearly indicates that § 315 is a special application of § 314. Id. at Comment a.
67. See notes 65-68 and accompanying text infra.
68. See note 63 supra.
69. See, e.g., Nipper v. California Automobile Assigned Risk Plan, 19 Cal. 3d 35, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 854, 560 P.2d 743 (1977) (even though the insurance company knew the insured was
incapable of driving safely and that its insurance allowed insured to drive, it was not liable for
injuries to the plaintiff caused by the insured's reckless driving); Totten v. More Oakland Res-
idential Hous., Inc., 63 Cal. App. 3d 538, 134 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1976) (landlord is not liable when
an intruder shoots tenant's guest in the laundry room); Martin v. Ushev, 55 I11. App. 3d 409,
371 N.E.2d 69 (1st Dist. 1977) (landlord not liable for injuries to tenant caused by an intruder
even though landlord failed to repair locks and lights in the building's common area).
70. 43 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954).
71. Id. at 67, 271 P.2d at 27. The plaintiff was a member of the public who had the misfor-
tune to be in the wrong place when the thief negligently collided with him. Obviously, plaintiff
had no pre-existing "special relationship" with the owner of the vehicle. Nor was there any
relationship, special or otherwise, between the owner and the thief. The owner did not even
know of the thief's existence, much less have him in his custody or control. Therefore, the
court held that § 315 did not operate to trigger liability. Id. at 65-66, 271 P.2d at 27.
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public, that in the exercise of ordinary sense he should have realized the
danger of failing to use reasonable care to prevent access and use of the
automobile by other persons.7 1 If a court goes so far as to answer this ques-
tion affirmatively, then a general relationship supporting a duty of care ex-
isted between the owner of the vehicle and the injured party. Liability,
even after a general relationship is found to exist, is still not certain to fol-
low. The question of whether leaving the ignition keys in an automobile falls
within the scope of protection of the rule formulated by the general rela-
tionship existing between the owner and the public can be answered dif-
ferently by different courts, 73 and differently by the same court at different
times.
74
In Richards v. Stanley, however, plaintiff was not asking the owner of the
vehicle to control the imprudent interloper; the plaintiff was asking the
owner to control himself. He was not asking for protection from another who
happened to be driving the owner's vehicle; he was asking the owner not to
create in the first place a situation fraught with danger. By basing its deci-
sion upon section 315 of the Restatement, the court not only avoided a con-
sideration of the general relationship but also avoided the more basic, diffi-
cult question of whether policy should reduce or limit the scope of the
rule.1 Although Justice Traynor's use of section 315 of the Restatement in
Richards v. Stanley attracted some favor, 6 the same California court avoided
72. Another problem that arises regarding § 315 is the question whether leaving the keys in
the ignition is action or inaction. In favor of inaction, it could be said that what occurred was a
failure to remove something that ought to have been removed. On the other side, it could be
argued that in leaving something in the automobile that ought not to be left, the owner commit-
ted, rather than abstained from committing, a positive act. When the dividing line between
action and inaction is this unclear, the relevancy of a § 315 analysis should be questioned.
Section 315, after all, is limited to putative duties involving positive or affirmative action. In
Richards, the court rationalized that removing the keys was a positive action. Cf. Ney v. Yellow
Cab Co., 2 Il1. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954) (the court did not consider whether, in general,
accidents are foreseeable if one leaves the car in a situation for another to take, but whether
under the facts of this case, a theft of the car and hence an accident were foreseeable. Because
the defendant left his car running and unattended, theft was foreseeable and he was liable for
injuries caused by the theft).
73. Courts finding negligence include: Schaff v. R.W. Claxton, Inc., 144 F.2d 532 (D.C.
Cir. 1944); Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Mellish v. Cooney, 23 Conn. Supp.
350, 183 A.2d 753 (1962). Courts taking a different view include: Galbraith v. Levin, 323 Mass.
255, 81 N.E.2d 560 (1948); Corinti v. Wittkopp, 355 Mich. 170, 93 N.W.2d 906 (1959).
74. For example, one year after Richards, the California Supreme Court found liability
when defendant left his bulldozer unlocked on a canyon plateau and he bad had past experience
of meddling. Richardson v. Ham, 44 Cal. 2d 772, 285 P.2d 269 (1955). Similarly, the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court found liability for injuries caused by a stolen car in Anderson v. Bushong
Pontiac Co., 404 Pa. 382, 171 A.2d 771 (1961), but denied liability in Liney v. Chestnut
Motors, Inc., 421 Pa. 26, 218 A.2d 336 (1966).
75. See notes 32 & 33 and accompanying text supra.
76. Pernienter v. Milner Chevrolet Co., 229 Miss. 385, 91 So. 2d 243 (1965). But compare
Permenter v. Milner Chevrolet Co., 229 Miss. 385, 405, 91 So. 243, 252 (1965) (Holmes, J,,
dissenting) with Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 I11. 2d 74, 85-86, 117 N.E.2d 74, 81 (1954).
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the "special relationship" section when in two later cases with slightly differ-
ent facts it held for the plaintiffs.
A contrast between two cases-Wright v. Arcade School District78 and
Raymond v. Paradise School District7l-helps to illuminate the interplay of
general duty and special relationship. In Wright, a five year old boy was
struck by a negligently driven automobile on his way home from school. The
plaintiff alleged that the accident occurred because of the "negligence of the
school district in failing to provide protection," "' thereby asserting, presum-
ably, that the school should have provided someone at the intersection to
supervise the children as they crossed. Citing both Richards v. Stanley and
section 315, the court fell back on the same old chestnut that one has no
duty to take affirmative steps to protect another unless there is "a duty to
act emanating from some special relationship recognized by the law."" Ac-
cordingly, the court held that the school had no duty to exercise reasonable
care for the safety of five year old children crossing busy intersections near
the school because such a duty would involve affirmative, positive acts."2
The dissenter, however, thought that the facts of Wright fell within the
"special circumstances" exception contained in Raymond, decided only a
year earlier by the same court.' There, a seven year old child was struck
77. Hergenrether v. East, 61 Cal. 2d 440, 393 P.2d 164 (1964) (discussed in note 83 infra);
Richardson v. Ham, 44 Cal. 2d 772, 285 P.2d 269 (1955) (discussed in note 83 infra).
78. 230 Cal. App. 2d 272, 40 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1964).
79. 218 Cal. App. 2d 1, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1963).
80. 230 Cal. App. 2d at 276, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
81. Id. at 277, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
82. Id. at 277-78, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
83. Id. at 282-85, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 817-19 (quoting Raymond v. Paradise Unified School
Dist., 218 Cal. App. 2d 1, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1963)). Interestingly, both Wright and Raymond
were authored by the same judge.
The "special circumstances" exception to the restraints of § 314 of the Restatement Second
was applied to Richardson v. Ham, 44 Cal. 2d 772, 285 P.2d 269 (1955). The action in Richard-
son centered on the damage caused by a bulldozer which was left unguarded by the driver and
was subsequently stolen by several youths who, unable to control the machine, jumped off of it
as it careened off a hill causing damage to plaintiff's property. Defendants relied upon Richards
v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954), which held that in the absence of special cir-
cumstances, the duty of an owner of an automobile to exercise reasonable care in the manage-
ment thereof does not include a duty to remove the ignition key to protect persons on the
highway from the negligent driving of a thief. The Richardson court distinguished Richards
because the extreme danger created by a bulldozer in uncontrolled motion, and the foreseeable
risk of intermeddling, justified imposing a duty on the owner to exercise reasonable care to
protect third parties from injuries arising from operation by intermeddlers. 44 Cal. 2d at 776,
285 P.2d at 271.
One year after Raymond, the "special circumstances" exception was again determinative in
placing liability on the defendant. Hergenrether v. East, 61 Cal. 2d 440, 393 P.2d 164, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1964), was based on an action for personal injuries resulting from the negligent opera-
tion by an unknown thief of a truck which defendant's employee had left parked overnight on a
skid row street, unlocked and with the key in the ignition. The court noted several significant




by a school bus while waiting for it in the designated waiting zone on school
property.' The plaintiff's allegation of negligence in Raymond was the fail-
ure to provide supervision in the bus loading zone." Agreeing, the court
formulated a duty to exercise care that was blind to differences between
action and inaction.' Taken together, the two cases revealed a predilection
to resort to section 315's "special relationship" analysis when the court was
determined to deny liability, and an equal predilection to venture in the
direction of the general relationship when the court wished to find a duty.
INCURSIONS ON SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP AND
RENEWAL OF THE LARGER PROPOSITION
Justice Friedman had based his own conception of duty, with its weighing
and balancing of determinative factors, on the California Supreme Court's
opinion in Amaya v. Home, Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.17 It was with Amaya
that the evolution from a no-duty rule into a general duty of care based
upon foreseeability was nearing its penultimate stage, at least in California.
The facts of Amaya involved neither a nonfeasance nor a "special rela-
tionship." A mother had helplessly seen her infant negligently run down by
a truck. The issue was whether she could recover from the nervous shock
and illness she had suffered caused solely by her apprehension of danger for
her son." The rule in such cases had long been that recovery was not
allowed unless the shock and consequent illness were induced by the fear
for one's own safety.89 In practical terms, the question was whether the
court would adhere to a firmly established precedent or regard the mother's
own injury as a wrong with a remedy.
84. Raymond v. Paradise Unified School Dist., 218 Cal. App. 2d 1, 5, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847,
849 (1963).
85. Id.
86. These were the very factors prompting the Wright Court's denial of relief. See notes
78-82 and accompanying text supra. In both Raymond and Wright the injuries to the children
resulting from the failure to supervise were plainly foreseeable. According to the accepted view,
however, there was no obligation to take affirmative action for their safety. In both cases the
court purported to weigh the eight delicate policy judgments. As a result, liability was imposed
in Raymond and not in Wright. Foreseeability, however, is distinct from the other factors.
Foreseeability forms a consideration that should have been weighed in a balancing process
against all the other liability limiting factors because foreseeability is congruent with the pre-
sumptive duty. In Wright, however, as is discussed more fully below (see note 126 infra), the court's
conclusion that no liability should follow was a pure value judgment because the court devalued the
importance of foreseeability by placing that consideration together with the other various factors in
the balance it purportedly employed in reaching its decision.
87. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
88. Id. at 298, 379 P.2d at 514, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
89. See, e.g., Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935) (no liability for
plaintiff's death even though it was the result of seeing her daughter killed by defendant's
negligently driven auto). See generally W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at
333-35 (4th ed. 1971).
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In the lower appellate tribunal, Justice Tobriner, relying upon the neigh-
bor principle of Donoghue v. Stevenson,"' reasoned that the mother was "so
closely and directly affected" by the act of the driver of the truck that he
should have contemplated her as he drove the truck.9 In its simplest state-
ment, the rule Tobriner proposed was that the mother was a foreseeable
victim because it was foreseeable that the mother witnessing her infant run
down by a truck would suffer shock and emotional anguish.9 2 In an analysis
containing substantial ethical content, Tobriner said that it was not con-
sonant with the reactions or the mores of contemporary society to hold
otherwise,93 and that, in a time of death and danger on the highway, it
would be anachronistic to grant immunity to the negligent driver of the
truck on the basis of "legal abstractions." 9 Tobriner briefly traced the
evolution of the concept of duty from feudal times, which fastened upon the
actor a rule of strict liability, through the time of the industrial revolution,
which entitled a man to do as he pleased "towards the whole world"' unless
a duty existed, up to the time of the formulation of the neighbor principle in
Donoghue v. Stevenson. In feudal times, explained Tobriner, the nature of
society "imposed an imperative for maximum procurable safety." If this
was so, Tobriner implied, then in these times of "death and danger on the
highway" a similar imperative should be imposed to protect us from the
automobile.' It would be imposed, not by a return to strict liability, but by
an easing of the equally strict no-duty rules which had their genesis in the
time of the industrial revolution.
Playing a central part in Tobriner's analysis of the issue were two identifi-
able features: the strong ethical current, evidenced by his reliance on
Donoghue v. Stevenson, and a keen concern for human safety. Most people
had come to accept the slaughter on the highways as a fact of life. Tobriner
was asking, in effect, whether this was the proper attitude. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of California reversed Tobriner's opinion in a 4 to 3
decision."8 Justice Schauer, writing for the majority, thought that fore-
seeability was not enough to trigger liability unless there was some founda-
tion for it, namely, a duty.9 Although this case did not involve a nonfea-
sance, Schauer expressed approval of the duty framework of Richards v.
Stanley, citing that case three times in his opinion.'" When Schauer came
to weigh the factors, which he differentiated and designated as administra-
90. See notes 26-32 and accompanying text supra.
91. 23 Cal. Rptr. 131, 134 (1962).
92. Id. at 140.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 141.
95. Id. at 133.
96. id.
97. Id. at 141.
98. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
99. Id. at 308, 379 P.2d at 519, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
100. Id. at 307-10, 379 P.2d at 520-22, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 40-42.
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tive, socio-economic, and moral factors,'' his scales tipped heavily in favor of
the defendant. In interesting contrast to Tobriner, who was bothered by the
slaughter on the highways, Schauer thought that as our industrial society
becomes even more complex, increased accidents on the highways become
"statistically inevitable." 102 We were a fast growing industrial society, still in
its youth, a hard-driving people, both in our daily pursuits and in our auto-
mobiles. Abjuring Tobriner's path, which he felt led only into a "fantastic
realm of infinite liability," 103 Schauer and the majority reversed his
decision, 14
Atnaya is instructive on several counts. For the first time since MacPher-
son, an influential American court in a significant case had made pivotal use
of the general relationship concept announced in Heaven v. Pender and
reiterated in Donoghue v. Stevenson."° Justice Tobriner had used the latter
case as the starting point of his analysis; 106 Justice Peters adopted in his
dissent the Tobriner opinion, word for word.0 7 Second, it was apparent that
the preservation and salvation of the no-duty concept would have to depend
largely upon manipulation and application of the feasance dichotomy and the
privity concept.' Therefore, section 315 of the Restatement would begin to
play a more prominent role in liability-denying rationales."° Amaya is also
instructive because it shows the divergent positions of the no-duty and pro-
duty factions on the subject of human safety.
101. Id. at 308-15, 379 P.2d at 521-25, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 41-45. Factors to be weighed against
the risk of harm include the availability of funds and personnel to correct the problem, the ease
with which the duty can be undertaken and the ability of others to also exercise protection, the
desirability of limiting the role of foreseeability so as to avert fraudulent claims, the practical
problems of administering justice where feasible, the difference between negligent and inten-
tional acts, the fact that every injury is not practically compensable, and the need to balance the
social utility of the action against the probability of risk of ensuing harm. If these other factors
are present, the relative weight of the foreseeability factor is diminished and a duty will not be




105. But see Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 32, 141 A.2d 276, 278
(1958) (abrogation of charitable immunity doctrine); Lokar v. Church of the Sacred Heart, 24
N.J. 549, 555, 133 A.2d 12, 15 (1957) (Jacobs, J., dissenting); Taylor v. New Jersey Highway
Auth., 22 N.J. 454, 462, 126 A.2d 313, 317 (1956) (holding that state highway authority waived
immunity). In these opinions Justice Jacobs, making initial use of Heaven v. Pender, called the
general proposition an "enlightened principle of due care [which] is taking hold more and
more." Id. at 462, 126 A.2d at 317.
106. 23 Cal. Rptr. 131, 134 (1962).
107. 59 Cal. 2d at 320-23, 379 P.2d at 528-36, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 48-56.
108. See notes 47-52 and accompanying text supra.
109. Until the decade of the 1970's, § 315 was only rarely utilized by the courts; however,
beginning about in the mid-1970's, the "special relationship" analysis of § 315 has attracted
increasing favor, both from courts denying liability and also from those finding a duty. A fre-
quency summary of appellate cases follows:
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Five years later, Justice Tobriner, now a member of the California Su-
preme Court, authored the decision that overruled Amaya: Dillon v.
Legg."' A few months later, in Rowland v. Christian,"' the same California
court took another step to put the no duty rule to rest when it abolished the
classification of trespassers, licensees, and invitees, and the corresponding
degrees of duty of care owed by the landowner to each. Like Tobriner's
opinion in Amaya, Justice Peters' majority opinion in Rowland indicated a
concern for human safety 112 and displayed a rationale with moral
perspective." 3 Most significant, however, is the use to which Peters put
Heaven v. Pender; it formed the starting point of the analysis, just as did
Donoghue v. Stevenson in Tobriner's Anaya opinion." 4 Identifying Califor-
nia's Civil Code section 1714 "' with the larger proposition, Peters said that
"a departure from this fundamental principle involves balancing a number of
considerations." 16
In Rowland a guest suffered an injury when he turned the handle of the
cold water faucet in a friend's apartment. The defective handle, which the
friend had known about for some time, shattered in the guest's hand, sever-
ing nerves and tendons." 7 The facts showed a negligent omission, or
nonfeasance. The injured guest alleged that the defendant did not undertake
the positive, affirmative act to warn him about the handle's condition."'
1934 - 1939 1
1940 - 1949 5
1950 - 1959 3
1960 - 1969 5
1970 - 1979 40+
The "special relationship" analysis is thus a rapidly expanding concept in tort law. See Mann v.
State, 70 Cal. App. 3d 773, 779, 139 Cal. Rptr. 82, 86 (1977).
110. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). See note 77 supra.
111. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
112. Id. at 111-19, 443 P.2d at 563-68, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 99-104.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 112, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
115. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1714(a) (West Supp. 1980). This section states in pertinent part:
Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an
injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the manage-
ment of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want
of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.
Id.
116. 69 Cal. 2d at 112-13, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100. From the grammatical
context it is clear that the court contemplated § 1714 of the Civil Code when it referred to the
"fundamental principle." Nevertheless, the identification of that section with Heaven v. Pender,
along with a confusing syntactical placement of its antecedents, tended to point to either as a
source of the "fundamental principle." While the principle could be found in § 1714, it was also
a common law principle traceable to Heaven v. Pender.
117. 69 Cal. 2d at 110, 443 P.2d at 563, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
118. Id.
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Under the traditional status approach," 9 had the plaintiff been an invitee,
instead of a licensee, the relationship between invitee and landowner would
have supported an obligation to take positive action to provide for the safety
of the invitee, either by repairing the defective handle or by warning the
guest of the danger." In Rowland, the nonfeasance aspect of the situation
was not examined for the very reason, paradoxically, that it was at the center
of the problem. It was because Rowland involved a nonfeasance that the
guest, standing in the shoes of a licensee, could not recover because a li-
censee could only have recovered for a misfeasance.'2' Had he been an invitee,
he could have recovered for the nonfeasance or failure to warn. '2
The intellectual purity of Justice Peters' rationale deserves mention. Sig-
nificantly, he did not treat the proposed exception to the rule of the catego-
ries as a departure from the common law; rather, he treated the categories
themselves as the departure from the common law." 3 Peters therefore ap-
plied the balancing process, not to a presumptive rule of no-duty, but to the
negating force of the limitation which, as a system of grouping into catego-
ries, now pressed in upon the fundamental principle. When the product of
the balancing process was measured against the exterior standard of
foreseeability, 21 no justification could be found for the continuation of the
limitation exerted on the fundamental principle.' The categories receded:
the residual fundamental principle remained.12 Naturally, the weighing of
119. See, e.g., Chance v. Lawry's, Inc., 58 Cal. 2d 368, 374 P.2d 185, 24 Cal. Rptr. 209
(1962) (proprietor who knows of, or has reason to know of by exercise of reasonable care, an
artificial condition that creates an unreasonable risk to business invitees is under a duty to
exercise reasonable care to repair the condition or to give adequate warnings to allow said
invitees to avoid the harm); Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course, 273 Cal. App. 2d 20, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 914 (1969) golf course owner is under duty to use reasonable care to keep premises in a
reasonably safe condition and to give warnings to invitees of latent or concealed peril).
120. Id.
121. See generally W. PROSSER, HAN1BOOK OF TIlE LAW OF ToRTs § 60, at 376 (4th ed.
1971).
122. See note 119 supra.
123. 69 Cal. 2d at 117-19, 443 P.2d at 567-68, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103-04. In this regard the
court stated:
Complexity can be borne and confusion remedied where the underlying principles
governing liability are based upon proper considerations. Whatever may have been
the historical justifications for the common law distinctions, it is clear that those
distinctions are not justified in the light of our modern society and that the com-
plexity and confusion which has arisen is not due to difficulty in applying the origi-
nal common law rule-they are all too easy to apply in their original formulation-
but is due to the attempts to apply just rules in our modern society within the
ancient terminology.
Id. at 117, 443 P.2d at 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
124. Id. at 117-19, 443 P.2d at 567-68, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103-04.
125. Id.
126. Id. At this juncture it might be usefil to comment generally on one aspect of this new
approach to the duty concept taken by the California courts and culminating in Rowland v.
Christian. In Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958), the court stated that the
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the factors in the balance called for policy judgments, but it now took place
as an inquiry into the justification of limitations on already existing duties
determination of whether a defendant would be held liable involved "the balancing of various
factors." They were: (1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff,
(2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suf-
fered the injury, (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the
injury suffered, (5) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and (6) the policy of
preventing future harm. Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19. In Amaya, 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29
Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963), see notes 87-110 and accompanying text supra, the court repeated the six
factors. In doing so, however, it depreciated the importance of the "foreseeability factor," stat-
ing that is was only one of the relevant factors. Id. at 307-10, 379 P.2d at 520-22, 29 Cal. Rptr.
at 40-42. Furthermore, the Amaya court coalesced the six factors into what it termed the
administrative, socio-economic, and moral factors. Id. at 310-15, 379 P.2d at 522-25, 29 Cal.
Rptr. at 42-45. The number of factors to be considered seemed to decrease or increase to suit
the court's convenience. For example, in both Raymond v. Paradise Unified School Dist., 218
Cal. App. 2d 1, 8, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847, 851 (1963), and Wright v. Arcade School Dist., 230 Cal.
App. 2d 272, 278, 40 Cal. Rptr. 812, 815 (1964), Justice Friedman listed not six, but eight
considerations which he termed "delicate policy judgments" to be weighed in the balance.
Each of these lists may be traced, by one route or another, to two influential articles in tort
law: Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: 11, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 255 (1929); Green,
The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 1015 (1928). Green originated the
enumeration and consideration of policy factors which have come to be considered a legitimate
step in the resolution of the duty question. See also 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 18.6, at 1052 (1956).
In addition, it is of more than passing interest that Green's celebrated formulation of his
"determinants of duty" occurred at least partially as a result of his dissatisfaction with Heaven v.
Pender. Recognizing that the "larger proposition" was indistinguishable from the foreseeability
test, he found it unacceptable that the law "should provide the judge with the same formula for
use in determining the existence of duty as it does to the jury for the determination of the
violation of duty." Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV., 1015,
1028-29 (1928).
A continuing enigma in tort law is the mechanics of the balancing process. How does the
court, after making a series of "delicate policy judgments," relate the resultant product of the
balancing process to an exterior standard against which that product can be measured in order
for liability to attach? Without some method by which to compare the product of the balancing
process with an exterior standard, it is impossible to impose liability. The consideration of each
of the factors may be learned and knowledgeable; and the balancing process itself may be
presumed, whatever its actual merits, to be a valid mechanism. Yet the balancing occurs, so to
speak, "in the air." Its product, no matter how weighty, cannot explain the imposition of liabil-
ity, unless something is weighed against that product. If the balancing process proceeds from a
position of presumptive non-duty, there is no bridge between the process itself and the de-
cisional result.
Assume, however, that we start from a position of presumptive duty. The basis of such a
position is the positive principle developed in Heaven v. Pender and in Donoghue v. Stevenson.
The change immediately causes a diametrical shift in the axis of the balancing process. The
object of the balancing process now becomes one of limitation on the presumptive duty, and the
negating force of each of the factors must be examined. Presumptive liability based on fore-
seeability provides the exterior standard against which to assay the product of the balancing
process. For example, in both Raymond and Wright the injuries to the children resulting from
the failure to supervise were plainly foreseeable, but according to the accepted view there was
no obligation to take affirmative action for their safety. In his analysis, justice Friedman pur-
ported to weigh in the balance the eight delicate policy judgments, so called, and thereupon
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rather than as a judicial option to be exercised in an open-ended creation of
new duties. I7
The fundamental principle that Peters propounded was identical to the
larger proposition of Lord Esher -'5 and to the neighbor principle of Lord
Atkin. In determining liability, the question was, in the words of the En-
glish Court of Appeal in 1978, whether there was a "sufficient relationship of
proximity or neighbourhood," 130 such that in reasonable contemplation
carelessness on one's part would likely cause damage.-31 If there was, there
existed a "prima facie duty." 132
imposed liability in Raymond and denied it in Wright. But foreseeability cannot be a factor to
be weighed; or, if one chooses to call it such, it is of an order different and distinct from the
other factors. Understood in this sense, it would not be inaccurate to state that foreseeability,
being congruent with the presumptive duty, is a factor against which the aggregate weight of
the other limiting factors is balanced. In Wright, then, the foreseeability factor is outweighed
by the combined weight of the other various factors. The conclusion of no liability follows. The
ostensible approach in Wright, however, and the approach of dozens of later opinions purport-
ing to use the so-called balancing process, was to lump foreseeability together with the other
factors and to downgrade its importance, in a generalizing, delimiting deliberation whose con-
clusion must rest ultimately upon no more than a value judgment.
In Rowland v. Christian, the "fundamental principle" was formulated as a positive basis on
which to premise liability. It was put forth as the source of the duty. The court stated that "a
departure from the fundamental principle involves balancing a number of considerations." 69
Cal. 2d at 112-13, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100. The major considerations, with one
exception, are the same six factors noted in Biakanja and in Amaya.
If the Rowland court had attacked the problem in the same way as the Raymond and
Wright courts had, it would have, first, recognized the orthodox common law rule that the duty
of landowners and occupiers is governed by the categories, that is, the status as either tres-
passer, licensee, or invitee that the injured party may have occupied. See Palmquist v. Mercer,
43 Cal. 2d 92, 272 P.2d 26 (1954). Second, it would have noted that, according to California
law, the status of the plaintiff as a licensee imposed no duty on the part of the defendant to
warn him of the dangerous faucet handle. Id. See also Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal. 2d 133, 148
P.2d 19 (1944). Finally, uncomfortable with the result dictated by that rule, the court would
have introduced the balancing process, indicating that the determination of whether a duty
existed in a particular case depended on weighing in the balance a number of factors, the same
factors which Justice Friedman in Raymond and Wright had characterized as "delicate policy
judgments."
It is difficult to find any nexus calling for the implementation of this balancing process beyond
a personal displeasure with the result dictated by the application of the rule shielding the
defendant from liability. Thus, the only purpose of the balancing process appears to be to get
around that unpopular rule. Moreover, the proposition that an affirmative declaration of duty
amounts to a statement that two parties stand in such a relationship that the law will impose on
one a duty of care toward the other becomes a rather circular truism. See Raymond v. Paradise
Unified School Dist., 218 Cal. App. 2d 1, 8, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847, 851 (1963). After purporting to
weigh the factors in the balance, the Rowland court would have concluded that a duty should,
does, or ought to exist, and accordingly have found for the plaintiff, without having first justified the
use of the balancing process.
127. See note 126 supra.
128. See notes 1-8 and accompanying text supra.
129. See notes 25-30 and accompanying text supra.




This question being answered affirmatively, a second question arises: are
there any considerations which ought to negate or reduce or otherwise limit
the scope of the duty? 3 The function this second question performs is
precisely the same function that the so-called "balancing process" performed
in Rowland, with the noticeable difference that it has the advantage of
avoiding the verbal ambiguities suggested by the concepts of balancing and
weighing.' It was clear that Rowland v. Christian propounded the first
definitive statement in the United States adopting the larger proposition
found in Heaven v. Pender. In itself this was significant. Moreover, it was
inferable that the "fundamental principle" would attach no import to the
feasance dichotomy and its cousin, privity. There was every reason to be-
lieve that the fundamental principle, like the larger proposition and the
neighbor principle, would be blind to any supposed distinction between mis-
feasance and nonfeasance."
THE TARASOFF INTERSECTION
The two lines of development-one, represented in Heaven v. Pender,
Donoghue v. Stevenson, MacPherson, and culminating in Rowland, and the
other traceable to Winterbotton v. Wright, represented in Moch and
133. Id.
134. The designation of the second question as one of balancing the factors is unfortunate
because it tends to disperse the court's attention in many directions. Furthermore, with charac-
teristic thoroughness, most American courts weigh all the factors. In all probability, however,
only one or two of them have any relevance to the question. Properly understood, it is not a
balancing process anyway. Despite the characterization, no balancing or weighing goes on,
either literally or figuratively. What occurs is an inquiry into the question of whether or not
there are considerations which ought to limit the presumptive duty. The inquiry is in no way
advanced by attempting to "balance" or "weigh" half a dozen or more so-called "factors," most
of which can have no dispositive bearing on the problem. The result of the enumeration and
separate consideration of these numerous factors is the partial occlusion or depreciation of the
one determinative consideration. The intrusion of foreseeability into these various factors wait-
ing to be balanced and weighed results in even more confusion. This bogus factor in the balanc-
ing process has already done its work. It is admittedly of the utmost importance in answering
the first question of whether there exists a relationship of proximity or neighborhood in deter-
mining whether or not a presumptive duty exists. Once foreseeability has served this purpose,
it has exhausted its usefulness. To put foreseeability to work in this second question of whether
to limit or negate the duty is logically redundant, as the second question would not be asked at
all except for the fact that foreseeability has been found in sufficient quantity to give rise to a
presumptive duty.
Foreseeability is not a factor in the scales but rather the sine qua non of the balancing
process itself. In a case involving the imposition of a duty to take affirmative action, foreseeabil-
ity may be seen as triggering the balancing process, but not as a part of it.
135. The re-orientation of the fulcrum of liability that occurred in Rowland as a result of the
abandonment of the tripartite categories (trespasser, licensee, and invitee) and the adoption of
the general standard of care poses interesting theoretical possibilities. Under the categories, the
characterization of negligent conduct as a misfeasance or a nonfeasance was irrelevant. Rele-
vance lay in the legal status of the injured party. When that was determined, the application of
a defined set of rules was comparatively easy. However, with the categories swept away in
Rowland and replaced with a general duty of care, the question arises as to what extent the
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Richards v. Stanley, and epitomized in section 315 of the Restatement-
intersected during the mid-1970's in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California." Making use of both the fundamental principle enunciated in
Rowland and the special relationship analysis of section 315, the court held
that the defendant psychotherapists were liable for their failure to warn the
intended victim of their patient. 37
Although the result is consistent with Heaven v. Pender, the decision
must be criticized because the duty emanating from section 315, articulated
and developed historically in terms of control and protection," has a wider
scope of operation and demands in effect a higher standard of care than that
imposed by the general rule that requires the exercise of due care.'' More
importantly, section 315 requires what approaches, and very nearly amounts
to, a fiduciary or confidential relationship.'
All the relationships mentioned in topic 7 "' of the Restatement and ab-
stracted in section 315 have in common a peculiarity, appearing on its face
to be perhaps no more than redundancy. The peculiarity is that the rela-
tionships, irrespective of tort principles, have traditionally been defined in
terms of the duty to protect or to control.142 Viewed from negligence princi-
ples, the attachment of a duty to exercise reasonable care with regard to one
standing in a particular relation is quite sufficient, once the relation entailing
the duty is established. But the Restatement particularizes the duty: it is to
protect, in one class of relations,"' and to control in the other."' The gen-
eral requirement in the formulation of duty under negligence principles is to
use due or reasonable care, that is, to be prudent; however, under the Re-
passive character of a negligent omission might be a factor in the determination of liability.
Foreseeability is now the key factor, and foreseeability of harm is ordinarily greater to an in-
vitee than it is to a trespasser. Still, as the Rowland court noted, in a particular case the
opposite might be true. 69 Cal. 2d at 117-18, 443 P.2d at 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103. It is
conceivable, therefore, that in a given situation there might be found a duty to a trespasser
where none exists to an invitee. Moreover, for the duty to take affirmative action for the safety
of the invitee, which formerly derived from his status, there must now be a new origin.
136. 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974).
137. Id. at 557-59, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 133-35.
138. See notes 68-86 and accompanying text supra.
139. See notes 1-4 and accompanying text supra.
140. See notes 61-67 and accompanying text supra. When applying the special relationship
analysis found in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 315 (1965), courts have sometimes
seemed to require almost a fiduciary or confidential relationship between the defendant and the
tortfeasor. See, e.g., Whitcombe v. County of Yolo, 73 Cal. App. 3d 698, 706, 141 Cal. Rptr.
189, 193 (1977) ("breach of special relationship" used to describe the county's alleged failure to
ascertain whether a probationer was dangerous to the public).
141. See notes 59 & 60 and accompanying text supra.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. One application of the duty to control is a hospital's duty to control mental patients. See
Underwood v. United States, 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966) (a hospital may be liable for injuries a
patient causes to another if it negligently permits a patient's escape); Greenberg v. Barbour, 332
1980]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:147
statement, protection or control in itself is the object of the duties particu-
larized in sections 314 through 320 and abstracted in section 315.145
The value and virtue of the phraseology to use reasonable care is that the
requirement so stated is still wide and flexible enough to deal with the full
range of human activities. It omits the specificity that would channel one's
conceived and executory actions into routes previously designated to require
the exercise of care. The exercise of reasonable care, in a given case, might
well go beyond taking efforts to protect or to control.' It is also possible
that the exercise of reasonable care might require, in another case, less than
one or more of a cluster of acts explicable in terms of protection or control.
The denomination of the duty in words of to protect or to control thus tends
to narrow the range of the kinds of acts required in fulfilling the obligation.
If affirmative acts are under consideration, only those acts reasonably neces-
sary to protect or control others are prescribed. Acts falling outside the pur-
pose or the end of protection or control are not indispensable.
F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (a cause of action is present when a doctor fails to admit a mental
patient into a hospital and he assaults plaintiff); Vistica v. Presbyterian Hosp., 67 Cal. 2d 465,
432 P.2d 193, 62 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1967) (when a hospital has notice that a patient might harm
others if preventive measures are not taken, it is under a duty to use reasonable care to prevent
any harm).
See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 340-50 (4th ed. 1971);
Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886, 887 (1934)
(discussed in note 148 infra).
145. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965). The Restatement's special relationship
analysis is inferior to a generalized duty to exercise reasonable care because the duty to protect
or control, at least as defined in § 315, is not an affirmative obligation to undertake new actions.
Instead, it only demands an exercise of vigilance that has already been voluntarily undertaken.
For example, in Tarasoff the psychotherapists voluntarily treated their patient. The duty to
control him was merely an extension of their acceptance of him as their patient. Similarly, the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965) imposes on a master the duty to control his
servant in certain situations. Again, this duty stems from the master's voluntary decision to
employ the servant. In contrast, the exercise of reasonable care was enlarged in MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), to require the same vigilance one must
exercise when he protects another. Yet, in MacPherson, the source of the duty was not the
defendant's voluntary action. Instead, the duty to protect a third person was included as an
enlargement of the reasonable care duty standard the law already imposed on the defendant.
Thus, MacPherson required car manufacturers to protect potential car buyers from unsafe
wheels even though the car manufacturers had not voluntarily entered into a special rela-
tionship with the ultimate car buyers. Indeed, the manufacturer would never enter into this
voluntary relationship since he would sell the car to a car dealer. Nevertheless, based on Mac-
Pherson the manufacturer was under a duty to exercise reasonable care for the protection of the
ultimate car buyer.
146. The Second Restatement provides, for example, that a parent is only under a duty to
exercise such ability to control a child as he or she in fact has at the time when he or she knows
of the necessity for doing so. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316, Comment b (1965). The
parent is not under a duty to discipline his child so that the child will be amenable to parental
control when it is exercised- But see Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of
Another 43 YALE L.J. 886 (1943) (discussed in note 148 infra).
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The problem with the words protect and control is, however, two-sided
because they come close to suggesting the duty to do acts reasonably con-
nected with the end to be achieved at one's peril. In semantic terms, one
either controls a dangerous person or does not. One either protects or does
not. Usually failure to protect or to control in and of itself indicates a lack of
purposive reasonable care. When the special relationships mentioned in Re-
statement sections 314 through 320 are examined, it becomes clear that one
group of them, those classed together under duty to protect, are fun-
damentally nothing more than undertakings."47 Take the innkeeper as an
example. He or she undertakes to do more for a guest than merely to exer-
cise reasonable care with regard to the latter's safety. He or she undertakes
to protect him. While this obligation stops short of absolute liability, it re-
quires something more than reasonable care. 4 ' It requires a kind of vigi-
lance cognate at least with the vigilance that Cardozo spoke of in MacPher-
son v. Buick Motor Co., 45 with one difference. The vigilance required of the
innkeeper springs directly from the nature of the undertaking. He or she
assumed the obligation, not to be merely careful or passively non-negligent,
but to exercise vigilance in behalf of the guest. The vigilance of MacPherson
has a different source: it is imposed by the law as an enlargement or refine-
ment in the standard of care. In the case of the relationships classed
together under the duty to control, it is remarkable that all of them may be
explained in terms of respondeat superior and the traditional position of the
common law that one having the ability, right, and power to control another
should make good the loss suffered by his or her remiss failure to control the
dangerous party or thing."5
147. See note 60 supra.
148. Harper & Kime, whose seminal article (The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another,
43 YALE L.J. 886 (1934)) provided the analytical cornerstone of § 315, admittedly took a con-
trary view. They thought that "[t]he duty involved in controlling the conduct of human beings
is at most the duty to exercise reasonable care for the prevention of harm to others." Id. at 888.
Not surprisingly, therefore, they believed that all human relations fell into one or the other of
the two general divisions they put forth. Id. at 905. In fact, their closing remarks on the
concept of relationship, if read literally, come close to those of Lord Macmillan in Donoghue v.
Stevenson (see notes 23-29 infra). The fact is, however, that Harper and Kime had in mind
anything but the general relationship formulated in Donoghue and in Heaven v. Pender. What
the article attempted was to provide a unified analytical structure that, one, is apparently ca-
pable of dealing with any and all factual situations, and two, has built-in limitations on liability.
Justice Cardozo's thoughts on the concept of relationship in Moch (see notes 45 & 46 supra),
from which Harper and Kime took their lead, attempted much the same thing. The authors'
assumption was that the special relationships described in terms of duty to protect and duty to
control were peculiar relationships to which there attached a consequent or derivative duty to
protect or control. On the contrary, the essence itself of those relationships is the duty to
control or protect. In other words, the special relationships discussed by Harper and Kime are
one and the same with the duty to protect or control. The duty and the relationship are iden-
tical.
149. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 2d 1050 (1916). See notes 15-22 and accompanying text supra.
150. See W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TorTS § 69, at 458-59 (4th ed. 1971) (using
the term vicarious liability in preference to respondeat superior).
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In the two groups of relationships, the duty is a consequence of an
already existing control or an already existing protection. The duty to pro-
tect or to control is not an affirmative obligation in the sense that it requires
one, as in MacPherson,' to do new and positive acts; it only demands the
exercise of a vigilance that has already been undertaken by choice or im-
posed, if not with the acquiescence then at least with the knowledge, of the
burdened party.
The Tarasoff case itself provides the best example of the problems caused
by these underlying incongruities in section 315. The Supreme Court of
California initially held, in an opinion that has come to be known as Tarasoff
I, that when a psychotherapist determines, or ought to determine, that a
warning to another is necessary to avert danger from his patient, he incurs a
legal obligation to give that warning." The relationship imposed a duty to
warn.'54 The court purported to derive this duty to warn from both the
special relationship of section 315 and the fundamental principle of
Rowland.' The impact of the rule was that the psychotherapist was now
obligated to warn almost at his peril. For the psychotherapist there was at
least one consolation; the duty was purposive. It was simply to warn, not to
carry out any other numerous, thoughtful actions. Actually, the court had
151. See notes 19 & 20 and accompanying text supra.
152. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of Cal., 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974).
In Tarasoff, Posenjit Poddar, a patient of the defendant psychotherapists, killed Tatiana Tarasoff
after warning his psychotherapists of his plans to kill her. Because of these threats, defendants
detained Poddar, but after he promised to stay away from Tatiana, they released him and asked
the police to return all information given them about Poddar. Shortly after his release, Poddar
moved into Tatiana's apartment. When she returned home from a trip, Poddar killed her. After
the murder, Tatiana's parents sued, alleging that the defendants failed to warn of a dangerous
person and to detain Poddar. The superior court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint without
leave to amend. 529 P.2d at 554-56, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 130-32. The appellate court afirmed. 83
Cal. App. 3d 275, 108 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1973).
153. 529 P.2d at 559, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
154. Id.
155. Id. In support of its holding that the defendants were involved in a special relationship
with Poddar and therefore under a duty to control his conduct, the court cited several cases
concerning a hospital's duty to control mental patients. See Underwood v. United States, 356
F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966) (a hospital may be liable for injuries a patient does to another if it
negligently permits a patient's release); Greenberg v. Barbour, 322 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Pa.
1971) (a cause of action is present when a doctor fails to admit a mental patient into a hospital
and he assaults plaintiff); Vistica v. Presbyterian Hosp., 67 Cal. 2d 465, 432 P.2d 193, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 577 (1967) (when a hospital has notice that a patient might harm himself or others if
preventive measures are not taken, it is under a duty to use reasonable care to prevent any
harm). The court analogized that the defendants were similarly involved in a special relationship
with Poddar. In addition, the court rejected the argument that the defendants also had to be
related to Tatiana before a duty would arise under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 315
(1965). In support of this proposition, the court cited Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of
Fargo v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D. 1967). In this case, the Veterans Administra-
tion was held liable for the murder of a woman by a patient who was released to work on a local
farm. The court found liability, notwithstanding the lack of any special relationship between the
Veterans Administration and the woman.
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followed section 315 to its logical conclusion, and in so doing it had implic-
itly demonstrated its inapplicability.
Two years later, in Tarasoff II,'I the court vacated its earlier opinion. Still
purporting to use both the "special relationship" analysis and the "fun-
damental principle" analysis, the court now held that the discharge of the
duty required the psychotherapist to take one or more various steps, de-
pending on the nature of the situation. 157  There was no mandatory duty to
warn, but there was a mandatory duty to exercise reasonable care, to take
whatever steps were reasonably necessary under the circumstances." s  This
duty might or might not require a warning, might or might not require
notification of the police, might or might not require any other numerous
and unstated, thoughtful actions. The duty, to repeat, was to exercise
reasonable care. While the court reiterated the words about duty to protect
from section 315,' s that special language was now verbal appendage. Con-
ceptually, the court had wrought a remarkable, though unexpressed, shift in
the basis of its holding. The duty of the psychotherapist was now placed
squarely where it belonged, in the fundamental principle and its
antecedents. 160
Ironically, in bringing section 315 of the Restatement to the forefront, and
making it one of the more active areas in tort law, Tarasoff at the same time
foreshadows the demise of the special relationship analysis, or at the very
least portends for it a contraction into its former, narrow boundaries. Since
Tarasoff II, other courts have begun to discover the incongruities of section
315.161
156. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14
(1976).
157. Id. at 435-42, 551 P.2d at 343-47, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23-27.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Also of interest in this regard is the recent decision in Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980), where the federal district court, following Justice Tobriner's
lead in Tarasoff, rejected the position that the therapist's duty is limited to providing a warn-
ing. In the court's words, it refused
to rule as a matter of law that a reasonable therapist would never be required to
take precautions other than warnings, or that there is never a duty to attempt to
detain .... This duty requires that the therapist initiate whatever precautions are
reasonably necessary to protect the potential victims of his patient.
Id. at 193 (emphasis added).
161. "Uncover" might be a better word. See Carroll v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 133 Cal.
Rptr. 461 (1976) (depositor-creditor relation does not give rise to special relationship between
bank and beneficiaries of depositors), rev'd sub non. Bullis v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 21 Cal.
3d 801, 582 P.2d 109, 148 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1978) (liability of bank based on its own negligent
conduct, not on the breach of a duty to control the fraudulent acts of the depositor-trustee);
Bellah v. Greenson, 141 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1977) (Tarasoff special relationship analysis applied; no
duty on psychiatrist to take measures to prevent, warn or inform deceased's parents of danger of
suicide), modified 81 Cal. App. 3d 614, 146 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1978) (irrespective of Tarasoff,
allegations sufficient to state cause of action for breach of duty to patient); Christensen v. Epley,
601 P.2d 1216, 1221-32 (Ore. 1979) (Tongue, J., concurring) (matron liable for wrongful death of
policeman when she negligently allowed girl detainee to escape in company of accomplice
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The result of the Tarasoff case is that, for the time being, courts relying
upon section 315 may be reluctant, if not unable, to impose liability in
newly emerging and socially sensitive fact situations.' First, section 315
requires what amounts to a fiduciary relationship. Second, when courts do
impose liability, they may find that it results in an erratic and vacillating
standard of care, requiring a warning or other preconceived acts, which in a
given case may either fall short of, or actually exceed, a standard of reason-
ableness. Moreover, courts wishing to deny liability will find the principles
embodied in section 315 a convenient and plausible device.'
known to have violent propensities; "'special relationship" under § 315 sufficiently alleged but in
any event was not required). But see cases cited in note 163 infra.
162. See Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70
(1980), rev'g, 88 Cal. App. 3d 936, 152 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1979). In Thompson, the court held in a
7-2 decision that the county was not liable for releasing fr(,m custody a sexual psychopath with
known violent propensities who had made a non-specific threat against a non-specific child
living in his neighborhood. The case is the leading post-Tarasoff example of the contrasting
results that follow from the conventional "special relationship" analysis and "fundamental princi-
ple" analysis. Purporting to apply Tarasoff, the majority conceived the issue in relation to the
performance of a particularized, purposive act: whether to provide a warning. Id. at 745, 614
P.2d at 732, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 74. As a condition precedent for this exacting but narrow obliga-
tion, there had to be an already existing relationship of the § 315 variety. Since "nonspecific
threats of harm directed at nonspecific victims," id. at 749, 614 P.2d at 735 167 Cal. Rptr. at
77, did not come close to establishing a § 315 special relationship, the conclusion of no duty was
logically fore-ordained from the moment the court declared the issue to be whether or not there
was a duty to warn. For the identifiable victim with a determinable name, a special relationship
would spring up and impose a duty on the defendant; the victim who was nameless and faceless
would be a statistical inevitability. Justice Tobriner, dissenting, pointed out that the duty, if
there was one, was not to warn but to exercise reasonable care:
[A] special relationship, such as that between the state and a person in its custody,
establishes a duty to use reasonable care to avert danger to foreseeable victims. If
the victim can be identified in advance, a warning to him may discharge that duty;
if he cannot be identified, reasonable care may require other action. But the ab-
sence of an identifiable victim does not postulate the absence of a duty of reason-
able care.
Id. at 760, 614 P.2d at 739, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
Just as § 315 of the Restatement served as a useful, plausible tool to justify the imposition of
a duty in Tarasoff, it served equally well to justify a contrary result in Thompson. Moreover, an
argument can be made that Thompson by implication has "vacated" Tarasoff Il and "reinstated"
Tarasoff l. Such contradictory decisions will continue until it is seen clearly that the duty is not
to warn but to use reasonable care and that it originates not in the special relationship concept
but in the fundamental principle of Rowland. Resourceful attorneys for plaintiffs might experi-
ence greater overall success in precedent-breaking cases such as Thompson if they simply allege
a failure to exercise reasonable care, rather than a failure to warn (with its concomitant pitfalls),
and let the evidence show what actions might or should have been taken.
163. See, e.g., McGeorge v. City of Phoenix, 117 Ariz. 272, 572 P.2d 100 (1977) (city not
liable for the death of an illegally-parked truck owner even though a police officer had reported
that the landowner would most likely resort to violence); Nipper v. California Automobile
Assigned Risk Plan, 19 Cal. 3d 35, 560 P.2d 743, 136 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1977) (no duty on insur-
ance agent to inform insurer that insured was senile and unable to drive) (over dissent by
Justice Tobriner, who authored the Tarasoff opinions); Beauchene v. Synanon Foundation, 88
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A preferable approach in Tarasoff would have been that of Justice Sims,
who dissented in the lower appellate decision, and found a direct rela-
tionship between the victim and the defendants "which although then un-
known to the victim . . was obvious to and recognized by [the
psychotherapists]." 164 In other words, Sims would have employed the fun-
damental principle to find a duty to exercise reasonable care without advert-
ing to section 315.M
The immediate significance of Tarasoff is that it seems to have engrafted
the special relationship concept onto the fundamental principle. The result
can only be to retard the final establishment of a concept of duty unimpeded
by privity or the misfeasance-nonfeasance dichotomy. New duties will de-
velop, as exemplified in Tarasoff, despite anything courts may say to the
contrary, not from the "special relationship" of section 315, but from the
larger proposition of Heaven v. Pender. Courts are trying now, and will
continue to try for a time, to fit their decisions into the constraints of section
315.11 In the end, however, it will be held that if a "special relationship" is
necessary before the law will require one person to take reasonable steps to
avert foreseeable harm befalling another human being, then (as was similarly
said years ago by a court confronted with the privity of contract obstacle) a
Cal. App. 3d 342, 151 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1979) (no duty on rehabilitation program with regard to
escape of probationer with violent propensities); Coffman v. Kennedy, 74 Cal. App. 3d 28, 141
Cal. Rptr. 267 (1977) (passenger who served driver intoxicated beverages owes no duty to third
person injured by the driver to control driver's conduct); Harland v. State, 73 Cal. App. 3d 894,
141 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1977), vacated, 75 Cal. App. 3d 475, 142 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1977) (no duty of
care on veterans' home with regard to driving of resident patient known to have physical and
mental disabilities, with long history of headaches and blackouts); DeSuza v. Andersack, 63 Cal.
App. 3d 694, 133 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1976) (no duty on passenger with regard to conduct of intoxi-
cated owner-driver); Mangeris v. Gordon, 94 Nev. 400, 580 P.2d 481 (1978) (operator of a
massage parlor owed patron no duty even though patron was murdered by a taxi driver whom
the parlor owner called and whom the owner knew to have violent tendencies; even if special
relationship, no duty because risk unforeseeable); Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.
2d 801 (Minn. 1979) (city owed no duty to high school student injured because of failure of fire
inspector to discover obvious fire code violations); Felty v. City of Lawton, 578 P.2d 757 (Okla.
1978) (city owes no duty to plaintiff when police officer left the key in his car which was stolen
by a thief who then collided with deceased's vehicle); Cecil v. Hardin, 575 S.W.2d 268 (Tenn.
1978) (passenger not liable for wrongful death of bicyclist even though passenger and driver
both intoxicated and on joint drinking venture).
164. 108 Cal. Rptr. at 896. Justice Sims stated:
The lack of an express prior relationship between the victim and her parents, on
the one hand, and the employees of the Regents on the other, is not determinative
in this case, because the peculiar circumstances of the case in themselves supply a
relationship, which although then unknown to the victim, was obvious to and recog-
nized by those acting on behalf of the Regents.
Id.
165. Id. See also McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 491, 403 A.2d 500, 512 (1979) (on
all fours with Tarasoff, where although the court followed Justice Tobriner's special relationship
analysis, it noted that a duty can also be found "in the more broadly based obligation a practi-
tioner may have to protect the welfare of the community").
166. See cases cited in note 163 supra.
1980]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW




If the twentieth century with its machines and hurried, impersonal human
relations has taught us anything, it is that a little neglect may breed a great
mischief .6. Several acts of compounded carelessness in a nuclear power
plant almost render unliveable half the state of Pennsylvania. An improper
procedure in the maintenance of an engine mount results, in one case, in
the death of 275 air passengers; in another case, a band-aid approach to a
troublesome cargo door, in the death of 350. A state department official fails
to act on the perceptions of his eyes and ears, and the consequent dangers
inferable by a normal intelligence, and the result is that hundreds of Amer-
icans are slaughtered by a madman in the jungles of Guyana. The roof of a
newly constructed civic center unaccountably collapses just a few hours after
thousands had sat beneath it; later it is discovered that the inspection of the
roof was carried out in an incredibly perfunctory manner. The management
of a large automobile manufacturer decides, it seems, that it is in the best
interests of corporate stockholders to risk dozens of people being incinerated
in an unsafe vehicle rather than recalling that model and remedying the
defect at the cost of approximately $10 per vehicle. These instances display
various hues and shades of culpability; the common denominator in each is
that otherwise ordinary men wink their eyes at a little neglect, and even in
the moment of foreseeability content themselves with falling back on
nineteenth century legal abstractions that obscure, even to themselves, their
moral accountability.
167. Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 283, 90 S.W.2d
445, 450 (1936).
168. Benjamin Franklin's maxim, while perhaps a moralistic luxury in the eighteenth cen-
tury, is in today's world of machines an iron law: "A little neglect may breed mischief: for want
of a nail the shoe was lost; for want of a shoe the horse was lost; and for want of a horse the
rider was lost." B. FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD's ALMANAC (1757).
A particularly horrible tragedy emphasizes the above. A man and his wife and their two-year
old daughter were driving on the freeway at 60-65 m.p.h. The husband was driving and the
daughter sat in front between her parents. At some point during the trip the mother placed the
child on the rear seat. Shortly thereafter the child pulled the unlatching handle on the rear
door and the door opened. The child fell from the car. The child's father stopped the car and
attempted to rescue his daughter; both were killed by oncoming traffic. Two points were made
in the ensuing action for wrongful death against the manufacturer. The surviving mother argued
that the rear-hinging of the rear doors caused the fatal door to open wider and faster than would
have been the case with front-hinging doors and hence was a design defect. Second, she argued
that the position and configuration of the unlatching lever also constituted a design defect. The
court opined, one, that the manufacturer was not required to design a fail-safe product, and
two, that the "cause" of the accident was either that the driver failed to lock the door or that
the two-year old child "'deliberately" unlocked the door and unlatched it. Korli v. Ford Motor
Co., 137 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1977). The response of the court exemplifies the corporate attitude,
and an all too-often judicial attitude as well, that has punctuated modern life with one needless
disaster or tragedy after another. One might as well argue that a manufacturer is not required
[Vol. 30:147
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The world we live in today no longer provides room for a little neglect.
The notion that, absent a duty, one may be as careless as he or she pleases
toward the whole world, whatever its utility arguably may have been in the
nineteenth century,"69 is today a socially irresponsible notion. A rethinking of
the standard of care is required, and Cardozo's duty of "vigilance" serves as
a model.17' The word sounds moralistic, but the standard need not be. A
positive example is defensive driving, which is a constructive application of
the duty of vigilance in a social context. It is an actor-oriented vigilance
based upon an appreciation of the value of human life, rather than a goal-
oriented fastidiousness based upon a desire to evade liability, as, for exam-
ple, the essentially anti-social "defensive medicine," to which more and
more physicians are characteristically resorting.
Like it or not, we are all "inescapably hooked together," 171 and hooked
together fbr good.' Lord Abinger's fear of "an infinity of actions," 171 while
premised on a narrow view of human nature, will ironically be vindicated for
the simple reason that, as Lord MacMillan observed in Donoghue v.
Stevenson, "human beings place themselves in an infinite variety of relations
with their fellows." 174 Despite the predictions of doom from the legal
to design a fail-safe DC-10. Incredible as it may sound, that was precisely the position taken by
McDonnell-Douglas after the DC-10 Paris air disaster in 1974. Even though the manufacturer
had full knowledge of the ineffective latching system on the rear cargo door of the DC-10, no
substantial modifications were made. The position of McDonnell-Douglas was that the disaster
was "caused" by the failure of baggage handler Mohammed Mahmoudi to close the cargo door
properly. See P. EDDY, E. POTTER, & B. PAGE, DESTINATION DISASTER 377-78 (1976).
169. See note 21 supra.
170. See note 20 supra.
171. Justice Cardozo's pithy phrase from Moch v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159
N.E. 896 (1928). See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
172. Twentieth century life, whether we have consciously opted for it, or whether it was
bound to come from the very beginning, has brought us to a pass where it is as if we were
roped together on a steep mountain side. A careless act by one puts the rest in imminent
danger. That is so whether we design DC-10's, manufacture home appliances, operate conveyor
belts, or merely drive our automobiles. The concluding words of Edward Whymper in his book
SRAMBLES AMONGST THE ALPS (1871) are appropriate to describe, by way of metaphor, the plight
of man in a technological age: "Climb if you will, but remember that courage and strength are
nought without prudence, and that a momentary negligence may destroy the happiness of a
lifetime. Do nothing in haste; look well to each step; and from the beginning think what may be
the end." Id. at 334. Whymper wrote from tragic experience. He accomplished a life-time goal
when in 1865, along with six companions, he ascended the Matterhorn, a mountain that up to
that time had been considered unclimbable. On the descent, in the joy and excitement of the
victory, some member of the party (to this day no one knows who) hooked up with a badly
frayed rope. The result was that four men fell to their death.
173. See note 24 supra.
174. What, then, are the circumstances which give rise to this duty to take care? In
the daily contacts of social and business life human beings are thrown into, or
place themselves in, an infinite variety of relations with their fellows; and the law
can refer only to the standards of the reasonable man in order to determine
whether any particular relation gives rise to a duty to take care as between those
who stand in that relation to each other. The grounds of action may be as various
and manifold as human errancy; and the conception of legal responsibility may
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Jeremiahs,7 s it is hardly likely that the acceptance of the doctrine of Heaven
v. Pender and the adoption of Thomas v. Winchester in its full import will
lead into the "fantastic realm of infinite liability." 176 Although the relations
that may give rise to a duty of care are infinite in number, the most that the
foreseeability test requires is that one exercise reasonable care, a reasonable
care founded not in the intricacies of privity17r or the metaphysics of the
action-inaction variation, 78 but in ethics-that people exercise the same
reasonable care towards others that they expect others to exercise towards
them. "
The larger proposition of Heaven v. Pender, the neighbor principle of
Donoghue v. Stevenson, the fundamental principle of Rowland v. Christian,
Cardozo's duty of vigilance: these are way stations in the path of the de-
velopment of the duty concept. It is submitted that they all point the same
way-to the social imperative of maximum procurable safety."s  The duty
principle of the twenty-first century will be the moral axiom from which
develop in adaptation to altering social conditions and standards. The criterion of
judgment must adjust and adapt itself to the changing circumstances of life. The
categories of negligence are never closed.
Donoghue v. Stevenson, [19321 A.C. at 619.
175. Justice Musmanno's characterization of the "crushing burden" school of jurisprudence.
See note 46 supra.
176. See note 103 and accompanying text supra.
177. See, e.g., Bartell v. Palos Verdes Peninsula School Dist., 83 Cal. App. 3d 492, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 898 (1978) (plaintiff's 12-year old son was killed when playing on a skateboard at an
unsupervised school playground; the court, in denying liability, utilized the "special rela-
tionship" concept in much the same way that earlier courts had used the privity concept; there
existed no special relationship because there was no allegation that plaintiff's son was a student
at the school). See also McDowell v. County of Alameda, 88 Cal. App. 3d 321, 151 Cal. Rptr.
779 (1979). In McDowell, defendant hospital and physicians determined that patient was a dan-
ger to himself and others yet sent him to a special care center by taxi, from which the patient
escaped and while at large murdered the plaintiff's decedent. The court, in assuming away the
actual problem in a style reminiscent of Richards v. Stanley (see notes 70-77 and accompanying
text supra), held that no special relationship existed between the defendant and the decedent or
between the defendant and the patient. Such judicial approaches invite, ultimately, the same
kind of comment that the privity defense inspired in food cases in the early 1900's: "The rem-
edies of injured consumers ought not to be made to depend upon the intricacies of the law of
sales. The obligation of the manufacturer should not be based alone upon privity of contract. It
should rest, as was once said, upon the 'demands of social justice."' Ketterer v. Armour & Co.,
200 F. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1912).
178. For example, the metaphysical morass of Justice Tongue's concurring opinion treads
close to in Christensen v. Epley, 601 P.2d 1216 (Ore. 1979), where to avoid the special rela-
tionship analysis based upon the failure of the matron to retain control over the detainee,
Justice Tongue re-defined the matron's negligence in terms of affirmative conduct as "permit-
ting and assisting" the escape (see note 161 supra). See also notes 47-50 and accompanying text
supra (Justice Cardozo's attempt in Moch to deal with the action-inaction dichotomy).
179. This is, of course, stated in terms of the Golden Rule. Lord Atkin in formulating the
neighbor principle drew on the same source. See SALMOND ON THE LAW OF ToRTs 197 (17th ed.
1977). Lord Esher's larger proposition (note 3 supra) amounts to a statement in legal terms of
the same precept, and Justice Cardozo's duty of vigilance (notes 49, 170, and accompanying text
supra) seems to incorporate similarly an ethically based rationale of conduct.
180. See note 96 and accompanying text supra.
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Thomas v. Winchester took its course: so highly does the law value human
life, that it admits of no justification where life has been lost, or injury suf-
fered, due to the carelessness of another. 181 The end of the law is to protect
human life.
181. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 409 (1852). The rule of Thomas v. Winchester in its
full import is more revolutionary than either Heaven v. Pender or Donoghue v. Stevenson. In
the former case, Lord Esher himself, in speaking of Thomas v. Winchester, said that the case
went "a very long way," perhaps "too far." 11 Q.B.D. at 514.

